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MODERN CHARITABLE TRUSTS
MODERN CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND THE LAW
BY PAUL R. STINSON
Attempts of disappointed heirs and collateral kindred to over-
throw gifts to charity have been, perhaps always will be, com-
mon. The practitioner under whose direction the charitably
inclined give, should bear in mind that the instrument will
probably be subjected to judicial scrutiny. The usual grounds
of attack are that the trust is not purely charitable, or that as a
charity its declared purposes are so indefinitely expressed as to
be unenforceable. Such instruments are often assailed also up-
on the grounds that they violate the rule against perpetuities,
the rule against accumulations, or the rule against restraints
on alienation of property. On the other hand, donors have
plans for their gifts almost infinite in variety; charitable needs
are constantly changing and expanding with the advance of
civilization; experience has taught that gifts to narrowly com-
passed uses often encounter disaster and disuse; and finally
trusts of perpetual duration are common where the purpose is
charitable. The ideal gift is, therefore, one which not only ex-
presses the donor's intent, but is also flexible enough to accom-
modate itself, if necessary, to the needs of future generations,
and which at the same time is invulnerable to legal attack.
The law of charitable trusts is a law unto itself. Charity is a
favorite of equity. It has often been called a ward of chancery.
Courts consider it their duty to preserve them to their sacred
purposes, and they regard that duty as founded on principles
of the highest public policy. Because of this, property devoted
to charitable objects is exempt from many of the restrictive
rules of law. Many other rules, applicable only to charity, have
been formulated to protect them.
The distinction between charitable and private trusts, both
in their attributes and legal requisites, is fundamental. A pri-
vate trust will fail unless there are beneficiaries specifically
nominated or capable of ascertainment. Indefiniteness of bene-
ficiaries is of the essence of charitable trusts, and it has many
times been said that charity begins where certainty of bene-
ficiaries ends; that if there are beneficiaries for whose particular
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use the trust is created, it is not charitable.1 The public is
the beneficiary of all charity.2 A private trust is invalid unless
its declared purposes and objects are clearly defined. 3 Charitable
trusts, however, are sufficiently declared though expressed in the
most general terms. The only requisite of certainty is that the
will of the giver be expressed in such manner that a trustee of
ordinary intelligence may understand it, and a court of equity
may know the limits of his powers.4
The English Common Law of Charities, prior to the Statute of
Elizabeth, and the Statute of Elizabeth itself, are the genesis of
American charity law. Missouri has adopted both.5 In Mis-
souri, and it is believed in all states which have adopted the
English Common Law of Charities and the Statute of Elizabeth,
gifts to trustees, invested with a discretion to apply the funds to
any charitable object are valid. 6
In their earlier histories (though the rule has now generally
been modified by statute), New York, Maryland, the Virginias,
North Carolina and a few other states repudiated the English
Law of Charities, and either repealed or failed to adopt the
Statute of Elizabeth. In those states, even the nomination of a
trustee did not validate a charitable gift unless some limitation
was placed on his authority of selection. The theory of these
cases was that a testator had, in effect, attempted to confer on
another the power to make a will for him, and that unlimited
discretion is tantamount to ownership. On more than one occa-
sion, Missouri courts have said that decisions from those states
have little or no influence. 7 Expressions in certain Missouri
1 See argument of Horace Binney in the case of Vidal v. Girard's
Exec'rs. (U. S. 1844) 2 How. 127.2 Dickey v. Volker (1928) 321 Mo. 235, 11 S. W. (2d) 278.
3 Jones v. Jones (1909) 223 Mo. 424, 1. c. 450, 123 S. W. 29.
4 Russell v. Allen (1882) 107 U. S. 163 (construing a Missouri trust).
5 Chambers v. St. Louis (1860) 29 Mo. 543; Buchanan v. Kennard (1911)
234 Mo. 117, 136 S. W. 415.
6 Chambers v. St. Louis, supra; Howe v. Wilson (1886) 91 Mo. 45;
3 S. W. 390; Powell v. Hatch (1890) 100 Mo. 592, 14 S. W. 49; Barkley v.
Donnelly (1892) 112 Mv. 561, 19 S. W. 305; Buckley v. Monck (Mo. 1916)
187 S. W. 31; Sappington v. School Fund Trustee (1894) 123 Mo. 32, 27
S. W. 356; Sandusky v. Sandusky (1914) 261 Mo. 351, 168 S. W. 1150;
In re Rahn's Estate (1927) 316 Mo. 492, 291 S. W. 120; Harger v. Bar-
rett (1928) 319 Mo. 633, 5 S. W. (2d) 1100; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Little (1928) 320 Mo. 1058, 10 S. W. (2d) 47.
7 Chambers v. St. Louis, supra; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little,
supra.
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opinions have led to the view in some quarters that to be valid,
a charitable trust must be to some definite charitable purpose
and for the benefit of a definite class. It will be found, how-
ever, that where Missouri cases have held void attempted gifts
to charity, the decisions rest, not on the proposition that a gift
to a trustee for charity generally is void, but rather for the
reasons that in the particular will, the vagueness of its declared
purposes made it impossible for the court to determine what the
testator meant; or that he had communicated to his trustees
secret or oral instructions outside of the will, rendering it im-
possible for the court to prevent or correct an abuse of the trust;
or that the gift was direct to charity without the intervention of
a trustee.s
By the Elizabethan statute chancery courts were authorized
through the appointment of a commission to select the charity
and administer the gift where the instrument evidencing the
gift neither designated a specific charitable purpose nor ap-
pointed a trustee. Prior to the statute the King, as parens
patriae, made such selections and administered such gifts as a
part of the royal prerogative. American equity courts, how-
ever, have generally been regarded as not possessing these so-
called administrative or executive powers. In America, there-
fore, as has many times been said, there is a wide distinction
between a gift to charity generally and a gift to trustees who
have qualified and are willing to act, and who have been in-
vested with general charitable powers. 9 The assertion that un-
limited discretion to trustees to give in charity is tantamount
to ownership, and is in effect the substitution of the will of the
trustee for that of the testator, is wholly unsupportable in prin-
ciple. All charitable trusts are discretionary. And, be the dis-
cretion narrow or wide, in either instance, the trustee in the
performance of his duties is merely carrying out his testator's
will, not making it. Power to apply the fund to one or several
charitable objects or for the benefit of one or several classes,
is as broad in law as the discretiou to apply the fund to charity
8 Schmucker's Estate v. Reel (1876) 61 Mo. 592; Board of Trustees v.
May (1906) 201 Mo. 360, 99 S. W. 1093; Hadley v. Forsee (1907) 203 Mo.
418; Jones v. Patterson (1917) 271 Mo. 1, 195 S. W. 1004; Robinson v.
Crutcher (1919) 277 Mo. 1, 209 S. W. 104; Buckley v. Monck, supra.
11 Chambers v. St. Louis, supra; Howe v. Wilson, supra.
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itself. The difference is only in degree, not in principle. In
either case, the measure of control of the courts over the trustee
is precisely the same. In either instance, the trustee may violate
his duties, and the court may prevent or correct such violation
by restraint, or removal. While the limits of charity are wider
than those of any of its divisions or branches, they are never-
theless as clearly defined. American courts of equity are never
called on to execute or administer either until a breach has been
committed or is threatened. When this happens, the remedy is
exactly the same, and equally efficacious. A trust, therefore, for
general charitable purposes is neither too vague nor indefinite
for enforcement. Generality is not vagueness.
A study of recent cases discloses that the earlier narrow judi-
cial attitude of some courts toward trusts for general charitable
purposes, has been relaxed in favor of a more liberal view.
There is a reason for this. Evolution has taken place in the art
of public giving.
Donations to perpetual charitable objects have always been
valid.' 0 No man has ever been found wise enough accurately to
forecast the needs of future generations. Many great men who
have sought to immortalize themselves with their philanthropies
have succeeded only in perpetuating their mistakes. In England
today, some twenty thousand English foundations have ceased to
operate because changing conditions have nullified the good in-
tentions of their donors. Julius Rosenwald said:
Millions-soon it will be billions-of dollars are today ly-
ing idle because the purposes for which they have been
endowed have largely disappeared.
In the Bryan Mullanphy will," the testator gave a huge sum
of money in trust for the benefit of poor immigrants passing
through St. Louis on their way bona fide to settle in the West.
Time has paralyzed this trust's usefulness. Alexander Hamilton
drew the Randall will of the famous Sailor's Snug Harbor case,' 2
whereby the testator's farm was given to be used as a haven
for superannuated sailors. Many years later the cy-pres doc-
trine had to be applied to prevent a failure of the gift. Today
20 Russell v. Allen, supra.
3" Chambers v. St. Louis, supra.12 Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor (U. S. 1830) 3 Pet. 99.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss4/3
MODERN CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Fifth Avenue, New York, runs through what once was the farm,
and the tract is valued at between thirty and forty million dol-
lars. The swollen fund is of little practical value. Benjamin
Franklin, in drawing his will, assumed that there would always
be "workmen's apprentices" and made a charitable bequest for
loans to "young married artificers not over the age of twenty-
five." He further provided that the unused interest, as well as
the principal, was to be lent out for one hundred years, at which
time the capital was to be spent for the benefit of the City of
Boston for constructing "fortifications, bridges, aqueducts, pub-
lic buildings, pavements, etc." He also foresaw that the wells
which in his day supplied Philadelphia with water would in
time become polluted, and he provided a fund which could be
used by Philadelphia for piping waters from a creek nearby
into the city.13 "Poor artificers" and "apprentices" soon ceased
as a class. When the accumulated principals of the funds were
ready for distribution Boston had provided herself with pave-
ments and no longer needed to be fortified; and Philadelphia had
in the meantime provided herself with a water supply. Many
years ago an Englishman who in his lifetime had been captured
by pirates, left a huge fortune for the ransom of any British
subject suffering the same fate. The last use of the fund was
in 1723, and today pirates are found only on the moving picture
screen. Funds devoted to specified research purposes, for the
ascertainment of the cause and the cure for various diseases,
such as yellow fever, typhoid, etc., became useless immediately
upon discovery of the cause and the cure. Some years ago a
railroad president gave a huge fortune for the purpose of
providing a home for the widows and orphans of railroad engi-
neers and firemen killed in railroad accidents. Today the insti-
tution is sheltering six of the class, and advertising extensively
to get them. Instances could be multiplied where the gifts of
good-intending but short-sighted donors have become useless,
purposeless, impossible. The cy-pres power of equity courts has
been invoked innumerable times with varying success in efforts
to save circumscribed gifts from destruction.
Practical, systematic and scientific methods have replaced
13Boston v. Doyle (1903) 184 Mass. 373, 68 N. E. 851; Franklin v.
Philadelphia (1893) 2 Pa. Dist. Reps. 435.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
haphazard, impulsive and unsystematic giving. Gifts of great
fortunes are now made for purposes of the most general char-
acter. The charter of the Rockefeller Foundation, organized
as a corporation under the laws of New York in 1913, to which
already has been given almost two hundred million dollars, pro-
vides that its object is to receive and maintain funds to apply
the principal and income thereof "to promote the well-being of
mankind throughout the world." The Julius Rosenwald Fund,
organized as a corporation, provides in its charter and by-laws:
"The object for which it is organized shall be the well-being of
mankind." Thus, these two great Foundations hold their funds
on trusts of the widest possible charitable range, and the bene-
ficiary is the public of the world. Inter vivos charitable trusts
are subject to the same legal rules as testamentary dispositions
of the same character. The Cleveland Foundation trust, com-
munity chests in various cities in the country, have no limita-
tion on their powers in charity giving.
Mr. Rosenwald believed that the dedication of huge fortunes
to perpetual charitable uses was ill-advised. Accordingly he pro-
vided shortly before his death that the entire principal and in-
come of the Rosenwald fund should be expended within twenty-
five years from that event. Other great and wealthy men be-
lieve in perpetual endowments and limit their trustees to the
expenditure of income. It would seem that a trust which ad-
heres to neither of these extreme views is preferable. We sug-
gest a gift to trustees and their successors, with authority to
use income or capital. The operation of such a trust would be
so flexible that the funds could be applied to any current need,
even "in states unborn and in accents yet unknown." Such a
plan recognizes that trustees in charge of the funds at any later
time, will best be fitted to sense a current need and fill it.
The advantages of a wide discretion are apparent. The ob-
jects of trusts for generally declared purposes can never fail.
Their usefulness will never be impaired. Never will suits for
construction be filed. No person, corporation or group has, or
ever will have, a claim on it. The cy-pres doctrine need never
be invoked or applied.
If fire devastates a city, if flood lays waste, or famine, pesti-
lence or even the blight of war comes, all or any part of the fund
may'be used to alleviate conditions or ameliorate suffering.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss4/3
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A trust without specific beneficiaries named or capable of
ascertainment is valid only if its purposes be purely charitable.
If in such a trust both charitable and non-charitable purposes
are so commingled that some definite portion of the fund is not
devoted to the purely charitable object, the entire trust will
fail.1 It is obvious, therefore, that the trust's purely charitable
character should be made manifest in the instrument cre-
ating it.
There is a wide difference between the popular and the legal
meaning of the word "charity." At one time it was supposed
that charities derived their existence from the Statute of Eliza-
beth.", It was developed later, however, that that Act created
no new charities, but only recognized and codified those already
existing under the English Common Law.16 But it did enumer-
ate and define legal charities, 17 and in Missouri and all states
where it has been adopted, all gifts are charitable which fall
within any of its divisions or within its equity, spirit or
analogy.l8
The most famous American definition is that of Judge Gray
(later Mr. Justice Gray) in Jackson v. Phillips.19 It has been
adopted and followed in many Missouri opinions.20 This is the
famous language:
A Zollman, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES, see. 394; Perry ON TRUSTS,
(7th ed. 1929) sec. 711; Attorney General v. Soule (1873) 28 Mich. 153.
Baptist Association v. Hart (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 1.
1, Vidal v. Girard's Exec'rs., supra.
'1The purposes enumerated by the Statute as charitable are "... some
for Relief of aged, impotent and poor People, some for Maintenance of sick
and maimed Soldiers and Mariners, Schools of Learning, Free Schools, and
Scholars in Universities, some for Repair of Bridges, Ports, Havens, Caus-
ways, Churches, Sea-Banks and Highways, some for Education and Prefer-
ment of Orphans, some for or towards Relief, Stock or Maintenance for
Houses of Correction, some for Marriage of poor Maids, some for Sup-
portation, Aid and Help of young Tradesmen, Handicrafts-men and Per-
sons decayed, and others for Relief or Redemption of Prisoners or Cap-
tives, and for Aid or Ease of any poor inhabitants concerning Payments of
Fifteens, setting out of Soldiers and other Taxes."
1 Irwin v. Swinney (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 172, aff'd Gossett
v. Swinney (C. C. A. 8, 1931) 53 F. (2d) 772; Buchanan v. Kennard,
supra.
-' (Mass. 1867) 14 Allen 539.
'Crow v. Clay County (1906) 196 Mo. 234, 1. c. 260, 95 S. W. 369;
Newton v. Newton Burial Park (1930) 326 Mo. 901, 34 S. W. (2d) 118;
In re Rahn's Estate, supra; Catron v. Scarritt College (1914) 264 Mo. 713,
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A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined
as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for
the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by
bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of edu-
cation or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease,
suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish them-
selves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings
or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of govern-
ment.2 1
Judge Sherwood's definition in Missouri Historical Society v.
Academy of Science2 2 has been widely copied in Missouri and
other states:
. Any gift not inconsistent with existing laws,
which is promotive of science or tends to the education, en-
lightenment, benefit or amelioration of the condition of
mankind, or the diffusion of useful knowledge, or is for
the public convenience, is a charity within the meaning of
the authorities cited, and it is none the less a charity because
not so denominated in the instrument which evidences the
gift.
In State ex rel. v. Academy of Science,23 a non-profit educa-
tional institution was held to be operated "for scientific public
purposes," and this instructive definition of charity given:
A gift designed to promote the public good by the en-
couragement of learning, science and the useful arts, with-
out any particular reference to the poor, and any gift for a
beneficial public purpose not contrary to any declared policy
of the law, is a charity. And, if such a gift is administered
according to the intention of the donor, the property is used
for charitable purposes (Adams' Eq. 172; American
Academy of Arts v. Harvard College, 12 Gray, 582, 594).
The most famous English definition (approved in Catron v.
Scarritt Collegiate Institute2 4) is that of Lord Macnaghten given
in Pemsel's Case :25
725-726, 175 S. W. 571; State ex rel. v. Powers (1881) 10 Mo. App. 263,
266.
21 Crow v. Clay County, supra.
22 (1902) 94 Mo. 459, 466-467, 8 S. W. 346, 348.
23 (1883) 13 Mo. App. 213, 216.
24 Supra, n. 20.
25 (1891) A. C. 531.
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* . .Charity in its legal sense comprises four princi-
pai divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the
advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of
religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the
community, not falling under any of the preceding
heads. . .
Horace Binney's definition in his argument in the Girard
Will Case (approved in Crow v. Clay County 26 ) is as follows :27
And whatever is given for the love of God or for the love
of your neighbor, in the catholic and universal sense, given
with these motives and to these ends, free from the stain or
taint of every consideration that is personal, private or self-
ish, is a gift for charitable uses.
In Bok v. Collector,28 the Edward Bok Foundation was held
charitable. Judge Buffington, writing for the Third Federal
Circuit, after approving the definitions of Binney, Gray and
Lord Camden, said:
A trust for popular education in music, or for making
higher education accessible to the many, or for stimulating
American patriotism by recalling the unselfish sacrifices of
the fathers, or for the relief of human suffering through
new and improved surgical methods, or for the encourage-
ment of craftsmanship, or for the beautification of a city,
would be a charitable trust tested by any of the definitions
which the authorities supply. And if a trust for the promo-
tion of any one of these interests would be a charitable trust,
it follows that a foundation to promote all of them is a
trust that partakes of the nature of each.
Other leading and accepted definitions have been given or
adopted in Missouri opinions.29
Study of the opinions of the Federal District Court and of
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in the recent Loose
Will Case30 will be found profitable. In that case, Harry Wilson
2 Supra, n. 20.
27 Vidal v. Girard's Exec'rs., supra.
21 (C. C. A. 3, 1930) 42 F. (2d) 616, 1. c. 619.
29 See Crow v. Clay County, supra. See also Perin v. Carey (U. S. 1861)
24 How. 465; Newton v. Newton Burial Park, supra; Ould v. Hospital
(1877) 95 U. S. 303; Catron v. Scarritt Collegiate Institute, supra; Perry
ON TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) sec. 687; Zollman, AERICAN LAW OF CHARrriEs,
sec. 225.
30 Irwin v. Swinney, supra; Gossett v. Swinney, supra.
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Loose, who died domiciled in Kansas City, Missouri, left the
residuum of his estate, approximating four million dollars to
named trustees and their successors, with authority to apply
the principal and income of the fund "for the furtherance and
development of such charitable, benevolent, hospital, infirmary,
public, educational, scientific, literary, library or research pur-
poses in Kansas City, Missouri, as said trustees shall in their
absolute discretion determine to be in the public interest."
Mr. Loose's surviving collateral kindred filed a bill in Equity
challenging the validity of the trust upon the two grounds that
it was not purely charitable and that as a charity the powers of
the trustees were too broad for validity. Both the District
Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trust and
the Supreme Court of the United States has recently denied
certiorari. In ruling the trust valid it was held that its validity
was to be determined by the law of Missouri; that the gift fell
within the great and accepted definitions of a legal charity, and
that as a charity it met the requisites of certainty prescribed
by Missouri law. The words "benevolent" and "public," plain-
tiffs charged empowered the trustees to devote the fund to other
than charitable purposes.
Following the doctrine first announced in Morice v. Bishop
of Durham,31 many English decisions have held that donations
for objects of benevolence or liberality may be applied to pur-
poses not charitable in the legal sense. So also under some
English authorities, gifts for "public" purposes have been held
not necessarily charitable.32 The English view of the word
"benevolent" has had some American following. While Missouri
courts have not directly ruled on the word, they nevertheless
have used it interchangeably with "charitable," as has the Mis-
souri legislature.33 So also in Missouri and America generally, a
31 (1804) 9 Ves. Jr. 399, 32 Eng. Repr. 656.
3 2 James v. Allen (1817) 3 Mer. 17, 36 Eng. Repr. 7; Williams v. Ker-
shaw (1835) 5 Cl. & Fin. 111, 7 Eng. Repr. 346; In re Jarman's Estate
(1878) L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 584; In re MacDuff (1896) 2 Ch. 451, Attorney-
General v. National Prov. and Union Bank of England (1924) A. C. 262
1. c. 265; Blair v. Duncan (1902) A. C. 31; Houston v. Burns (1918) A. C.
337.
33 Hadley v. Forsee, supra; Society of the Helpers, etc. v. Law (1916)
267 Mo. 667, 675-677, 186 S. W. 718, 725; Turnverein v. Hagerman (1911)
232 Mo. 693, 703-4, 135 S. W. 42; State ex rel. v. Rusk (1911) 236 Mo.
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testamentary trust for "public" purposes is to an unquestioned
charitable use.34 Other and better reasoned English cases hold
that a gift for public purposes is charitable.3 5
Whatever isolated meaning "benevolent" or "public" may
have as descriptive terms in a trust, if they are associated with
"charitable" or other words of undeniable charitable import,
they are accorded the same meaning. 6
By another familiar rule of interpretation, "benevolent" and
"public" will be construed as words of charitable purpose. It
must be accepted that in one of their meanings, at least, these
words in a testamentary gift import charity. Where a word
has two meanings, one of which will defeat and the other sus-
tain the trust, the courts are bound to give it that construction
which will uphold it. 7
201, 216, 139 S. W. 199; Buckley v. Monck, supra; Adams v. University
Hospital (1907) 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453; Estate of Jacob Rahn,
supra; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 602.
"4 Buchanan v. Kennard, supra; Newton v. Newton Burial Park, supra;
Dickey v. Volker, supra; Perin v. Carey, supra; Stuart v. City of Easton
(C. C. A. 3, 1896) 74 F. 854; Russell v. Girard Trust Co. (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1909) 171 F. 161; Girard Trust Co. v. Russell (C. C. A. 3, 1910) 179 F.
446; Todd v. Citizens' Gas Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1931) 46 F. (2d) 855; Vidal v.
Girard's Executors, supra. See also State ex rel. v. Trustees of William
Jewell College (1911) 234 Mo. 299, 136 S. W. 397; Halbruegger v. City of
St. Louis (1924) 302 Mo. 573; 262 S. W. 379; Jasper County Farm Bureau
v. Jasper County (1926) 315 Mo. 560, 286 S. W. 381.
35 Attorney General v. Heelis (1824) 2 Sim. & St. 67, 57 Eng. Repr. 270
(followed in Stuart v. City of Easton, supra) ; Dolan v. Macdermot (1867)
L. R. 3 Ch. App. 676; Nightingale v. Coulburn (1847) 5 Hare 484, 67 Eng.
Repr. 1003; Trustees of the British Museum v. White (1826) 2 Sim. & St.
594, 57 Eng. Repr. 473 (approved in Lackland v. Walker (1899) 151 Mo.
210, 1. c. 241, 52 S. W. 414, 1. c. 423).
31 Saltonstall v. Sanders (Mass. 1865) 11 Allen 446 (approved in Howe
v. Wilson, supra); Barkley v. Donnelly (1892) 112 Mo. 561, 19 S. W. 305;
Estate of Hinckley (1881) 58 Cal. 457, 1. c. 510 (approved in Crow v. Clay
County, supra); Tappan's Appeal (1885) 52 Conn. 412; Thorp v. Lund
(1917) 227 Mass. 474, 116 N. E. 946; In re Huyck (1905) 10 Ont. L. R.
480; In re Sutton, Stone v. Attorney-General (1885) 28 Ch. Div. 464;
Halbruegger v. City of St. Louis (1924) 302 Mo. 573, 262 S. W. 379; In re
Robinson (1911) 203 N. Y. 380, 96 N. E. 925; In re Frash's Will (1927)
245 N. Y. 174, 156 N. E. 656; St. Paul's Church v. Attorney General (1895)
164 Mass. 188, 41 N. E. 231; In re Bennett, Gibson v. Attorney-General
(1875) 1 Ch. Div. 305; In re Salters, Rea v. Crozier et al. (1911) 1 Ir. R.
289; Rickerby v. Nelson (1912) 1 Ir. R. 343; Hay's Trustees v. Baillie
(1908) Scottish Court of Sessions Cases 1224; Paterson's Trustees v.
Paterson (1909) Scottish Court of Sessions Cases 485; Wilson v. The Lord
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It is the duty of courts, first to ascertain, then to give effect
to a testator's intent. When a charitable intent is once estab-
lished, a charitable trust results. Even literal meanings fade
before a charitable intent. If need be, courts will supply, omit
words, or even transpose sentences, in order to give effect to
such intent. And where a charitable intent is apparent, the
law preserves the gift to its sacred purposes as a matter of
highest public policy.38
To the foregoing analysis and review we venture to add some
practical suggestions. No gift should be made to or for a
charitable purpose, as such, without the intervention of a trus-
tee. Every charitable trust should provide for the succession
or substitution of the nominated trustee or trustees. This will
negative a possible inference that the delegation of power or
discretion was personal. Donations to specific charitable insti-
tutions or purposes should be alternated by gifts over to other
charitable institutions or purposes, in the event that the primary
gift should for any reason fail. Such provisions do not violate
the rule against perpetuities as to remoteness. 39 Somewhere in
the trust it should be made clear that every declared purpose is
charitable. A qualifying phrase, following the words of de-
scription, that the fund is to be applied to such of the declared
purposes as are for the public benefit, welfare, or advantage,
would, it would seem, insure a charitable trust. Detailed or
unalterable directions as to the administration of the trust
should be avoided. It should never be forgotten that civilization
is in a constant state of flux, and that broad discretion and
general powers are preferable. Care should be observed clearly
Advocate (1926) Scottish Court of Sessions Cases 579; 11 C. J. 302; 46
C. J. 496.
37 In re Estate of Jacob Rahn, supra; Sappington et al. v. Sappington
School Fund Trustees, supra; Russell v. Allen, supra; Whicker v. Hume
(1858) 7 H. L. C. 124, 11 Eng. Repr. 50; Irwin v. Swinney, supra; Gossett
v. Swinney, supra.
38 Grace v. Perry (1906) 197 Mo. 550, 559, 95 S. W. 875; Sappington v.
School Fund Trustees, supra; State ex rel. v. Trustees of William Jewell
College, supra; Plummer v. Roberts (1926) 315 Mo. 627, 287 S. W. 316;
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little, supra; Russell v. Allen, supra; Inglis
v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, supra; Field v. Seminary (C. C. D.
Del. 1890) 41 F. 371, 375; Matter of Durbrow's Estate (1927) 245 N. Y.
469, 474, 157 N. E. 747, 748.
3 Russell v. Allen, supra.
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to separate the legal from the beneficial estate, and both should
be created by the use of words of the present tense, such as "I
give, devise and bequeath." Of course, the beneficial enjoyment
may be postponed if that be the giver's desire, but the transfer
of the estate to the charitable use or purpose should be imme-
diate and present.
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